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This paper aims to identify some factors that reduce evasion of customs duties in developing 
countries. Following the recent literature on customs evasion, we proxy customs fraud by 
discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics. Estimates first show that the more frequently a 
product is imported, the more customs fraud reduces. We argue that this result is indicative 
of the fact that customs officers use what they have learned from similar import declarations 
 use customs' internal information  to better assess the compliance of declarations. Then, 
we show that relying on an information provider  a pre-shipment inspection company in our 
case  seems to increase tax enforcement. Results indicate that pre-shipment inspections 
significantly reduce observed discrepancies in trade statistics. In line with previous studies, 
we find that the semi-elasticity of evasion increases with the tax rate. Finally, estimates 
confirm that enforcement is product-varying. Results are robust to various robustness 
checks. 
 
Keywords: use of internal information; external information acquisition; customs 
enforcement; tax evasion; pre-shipment inspections. 
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Kleven et al. (2016) stress that tax enforcement is excellent when there is third party 
reporting. Conversely, they indicate that tax enforcement is weak when there is no reporting 
of information. The taxpayer has a strong informational advantage in this situation. This is, 
for instance, the case with taxation of international trade transactions, notably the taxation of 
imports, as the customs authority does not know what export declaration was made by the 
exporting company at the country of embarkation.1  
 
Customs authorities are continually seeking quality information to offset the informational 
advantage of the importer. In practice paper trails do not help the customs officer, as 
supporting documents are often forged.2 Yet, the authority can rely on other information 
sources (internal or external) to estimate accurately the transaction value. Customs may infer 
the value from previous import declarations  using their internal information to assess the 
compliance of the declaration. Alternatively, customs can acquire information through the 
implementation of a pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programme. For this, the government 
enters into a contract with a private information provider, a PSI company.  
 
Since trade taxes  tariffs, excises and import value added tax (VAT)  continue to account in 
sub-Saharan African countries for a significant part of their tax revenue (see Chalendard 
2016), reducing the information asymmetry between the importer and the customs authority 
is of vital importance in these economies. Using a customs database from a representative 
sub-Saharan African country (named Country A3), with unusually detailed information on 
import transactions (see Section 3), this paper aims to discuss to what extent the use of 
internal information and the implementation of PSI programmes may support customs in their 
fight against fraud.  
 
Following Bhagwati (1964)'s approach, we proxy mis-reporting by discrepancies in mirror 
trade statistics  the difference between the export value and import value. Each observation 
is at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. Our key variables of interest are (i) the number of 
import declarations, and (ii) the pre-shipment inspection frequency. While the first aims to 
proxy the internal information available, the latter aims to quantify the acquired external 
information. Estimates indicate that 1 per cent increase in the number of import declarations 
leads to a reduction of approximately 0.4 per cent in discrepancies in trade statistics. The 
more a product is imported, the more customs fraud is reduced. As the customs risk analysis 
system does not exploit historical data  the information contained in previous import 
declarations  we argue that this negative correlation is indicative of the fact that in the field 
customs officers infer the transaction value of a specific product from the declared value of 
similar products previously imported. As in Javorcik and Narciso (2008), we find that 
enforcement is product-varying. Estimates also confirm that higher taxes trigger more 
customs evasion.  
 
                                                 
1  To improve communication between customs, the World Customs Organization has recently launched the Customs 
Enforcement Network digital platform. For more details on this, see Han and McGauran (2014). 
2  On the relationship between information trails and enforcement, see Pomeranz (2015); Almunia and Lopez Rodriguez 
(2015); Bachas and Jensen (2014). 
3  The country's name is kept confidential as the study provides useful information for tax evasion purposes on the risk 
management system of local customs. Country A has direct access to the sea (most imports pass through seaports), 
and, as in many African countries, Country A government's budget continues to rely heavily on revenue from border 
collection. The assessment of the customs value remains problematic, as in other African countries - see e.g Zake 
(2011); Montagnat-Rentier and Parent (2012). This is why the government (of country A) considers relying on the PSI 
services of a private company is still useful. 
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Regarding the external information source, the analysis indicates that PSIs significantly 
reduce evasion. Results show that 1 per cent increase in the frequency of PSIs results in a 
0.7 per cent decline in discrepancies in trade statistics. Given that PSI services are not free, 
only a cost-benefit analysis (not carried out in this paper)4 would allow us to draw any 
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of PSI.  
 
The interaction variable between our proxy quantifying the internal information available (the 
number of import declarations) and the quantity of external information acquired (the PSI 
frequency) is not significant. This lack of significance supports the hypothesis that the 
importer adjusts their declaration to the value estimated by the PSI company (legal practice).  
 
To address the potential endogeneity issue of PSIs, we use instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques. Given our unit of analysis (HS6 product-partner level) and the fact that we rely 
on administrative data, it is hard to find a valid instrumental variable. Nevertheless, we argue 
that the rate of import operations handled by a specific customs clearance office  called 
Office #1 seems to be a fairly good instrument. Office #1 is the main customs clearance 
office of the main seaport of Country A.5 Its activity does not rely on any risk analysis. 
Interestingly, the customs office is fully specialised in the clearance of containerised imports 
for home use. As a consequence, Office #1 clears goods (i) for which there is an incentive to 
cheat  contrary to other customs procedures (temporary admission, inward processing, 
outward processing, etc.) taxes are charged for imports for home use, and (ii) for which there 
exists an ability to cheat  compared to bulk imports, cheating is easier when imports are 
containerised. Thanks to a recent customs reform, different customs offices now perform at a 
similar level. Enforcement, therefore, does not vary between customs offices.6 This implies 
that importers that try to cheat have no incentive to strategically import through a specific 
customs office in order to escape taxes and duties. Put differently, this means it is unlikely 
that the fact that imported goods are released by Customs Office #1 has a specific effect on 
non-compliance. Our instrument is highly significant in the first stage regression. Although IV 
estimates confirm the bias (the coefficient is double), other results remain largely unchanged. 
Results also hold to the inclusion of trade partner dummies, HS-2 industry dummies or HS-2 
industry-trade partner dummies. Finally, note that findings are robust to a series of additional 
robustness checks, such as using an alternative measure of underreporting, using an 
alternative measure of the quantity of internal information available, and numerous changes 
in the sample size.  
 
The paper refers to the tax compliance literature.7 The benchmark economic approach of 
modelling tax non-compliance has been pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). 
Basically, the rational taxpayer evades if the benefits of non-compliance exceed the 
expected costs (the tax adjustment and fine). Compliance arises because of the fear of 
detection and punishment. Since evasion depends on the level of tax enforcement, a number 
of studies endogenise the probability of detection. Fack and Landais (2016) empirically and 
theoretically find that the elasticity of non-compliance is highly sensitive to the level of 
enforcement. Regarding corporate tax compliance, Almunia and Lopez Rodriguez (2015) 
highlight that firms react positively to stricter tax enforcement. As stressed by Kleven et al. 
(2011), enforcement also depends on the type of income. They notably find that third party 
reporting is an effective way to reduce evasion. Yet, Carrillo et al. (forthcoming) underline 
that firms, especially in developing countries, may find some alternative tax evasion methods 
                                                 
4  A justification is available upon request. 
5  A large part of imports arrive through the main seaport. 
6  Except for land border offices. A robustness check addresses the concern related to the (informal) trade across land 
borders. 
7  For a review, see e.g. Andreoni et al. (1998); Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002); Sandmo (2005); Saez et al. (2012); 
Hashimzade et al. (2013). 
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in response to their inability to cheat on third party reported income. In particular, they show 
that under a weak enforcement environment relying on third party information may ultimately 
have no (positive) impact on corporate tax revenue because of adjustments on less verifiable 
costs. 
 
Our work contributes to the emerging empirical literature on customs compliance. Customs 
evasion is typically proxied by discrepancies in mirror trade statistics.8 Evasion appears to be 
greater in countries where the rule of law is limited (see Jean and Mitaritonna 2010), and the 
level of corruption is high (see Fisman and Wei 2009). Fisman and Wei (2004)'s results are 
consistent with the conjecture that enforcement is invariant to the tax rate. The role of 
entrepot trade in facilitating evasion has been empirically studied (Fisman et al. 2008). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the role of Benin, Togo and the Gambia for unofficial transit trade has 
been stressed (Golub 2012). Customs evasion is facilitated by international networks 
(Rotunno and Vézina 2012). Supporting the argument that efficient border management 
highly depends on border point characteristics (e.g. the existence of suitable secure 
infrastructure and advanced computerisation), Mishra et al. (2008) find that the elasticity of 
evasion varies by the mode of entry of goods (airport, seaport or land port). Finally, it has 
been largely stressed that enforcement depends on intrinsic characteristics of products (see 
e.g. Javorcik and Narciso 2008).  
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 1 presents information sources. 
Section 2 describes our measure of underreporting and the empirical approach. Section 3 
describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results and includes several robustness checks. Concluding remarks are given 
in Section 5. 
 
 
1  Presentation of information sources 
 
While firms have private information on the import value, the customs authority does not 
have information on the true value. In order to determine the truthfulness of the declaration, 
customs therefore seek reliable information. In addition to the information provided by the 
mandatory documentation (commercial invoice, bill of lading, etc.), in developing countries 
customs can rely on two additional information sources  one internal and one external. 
 
1.1 Use of historical data: an internal information source 
 
Examining the efficiency of alternative audit rules (relative vs. fixed), Bayer and Cowell 
(2009) theoretically show that a response to the problem of hidden information can be using 
the free information provided by tax returns of competing firms.9 This finding simply states 
that, when a firm makes an extremely low (corporate tax) report compared with reports of 
competing firms, the tax authority should have serious doubts about the truthfulness of the 
tax return. Further investigations should then be conducted. Adapted to our specific context, 
                                                 
8  The existing empirical literature on customs compliance has mainly tried to estimate how customs compliance responds 
to taxes. Higher taxes are associated with more evasion. In the seminal work of Fisman and Wei (2004), estimates 
show that the semi-elasticity of evasion increases with the tax rate for China. Specifically, they find that 1% increase in 
tariffs increases evasion by about 3%. Customs evasion has also been empirically studied for India (Mishra et al. 2008); 
North America (Stoyanov 2012); Eastern Europe (Javorcik and Narciso 2008); sub-Saharan Africa (Van Dunem and 
Arndt 2009; Bouet and Roy 2012; Levin and Widell 2014; Worku et al. 2016); and Tunisia (Rijkers et al. 2015). Finally, 
note that underreporting of exports may also occur. For instance, Ferrantino et al. (2012) find evidence for 
underreporting of exports at the Chinese border to avoid paying VAT. 
9  Bayer and Cowell (2009) find that the tax authority has a clear advantage in setting up an audit rule to compare 
competing firms' tax returns  introducing a (relative) rule with an audit probability depending on competing firms' 
reports, instead of using a fixed rule  using an audit rule specifying a fixed probability of inspection. 
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their contribution suggests that exploiting the information contained in ‘competing’ import 
declarations  previously registered import declarations  may be helpful in assessing the 
transaction value of an import. If historical data has an informational component, then 
exploiting this internal source of information would facilitate tax enforcement in customs. The 
informational advantage of the importer would then be partially offset.10 Since declarations 
are secret, the importer has no information on reports made by other importers. Therefore, 
importers are not able to internalise these (potential) informational externalities unless they 
collude at the declaration stage.11  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, to the best of our knowledge, no customs authority currently exploits 
its internal information  historical data  in a systematic and formal way. In particular, no risk 
analysis system compares new import declarations to previous ones. Nevertheless, as 
argued below, customs officers in the field may make efficient use of the information 
provided by previous import declarations.  
 
Customs officers have to determine import compliance. To carry out this difficult task, they 
may, in addition to analysing supporting documents, draw on their knowledge/prior 
experience to issue an opinion on compliance. In such a situation, the customs officer uses 
information that he has learned from similar import declarations to better assess the tax and 
duties payable. This implies that the more frequently a product is imported, the more difficult 
it is to underreport. The empirical analysis tries to address this specific question.  
 
1.2 Pre-shipment inspection services: an external information source 
 
1.2.1 Background on PSI programmes 
 
Over fifty countries have experienced PSI programmes since the mid-twentieth century. PSI 
mainly consists of a set of verification services to assist customs authorities in combating 
fraud. These services, performed by a private company operating in the exporting country,12 
aim to provide an opinion on the main characteristics (value, quantity, classification, etc.) of 
the shipment after completing an inspection. For carrying out this activity, the surveillance 
company usually charges between 0.5 per cent and 1.05 per cent of the free-on-board (f.o.b) 
value of inspected merchandise, with a minimum amount. Fees are paid either by the 
contracting government or the importer. Finally, note that PSI contracts and PSI activities are 
regulated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on PSI, and by the code of 
practice of the International Federation of Inspection Agencies.  
 
Given that there are several stages, we provide below an overview of a standard import 
operation. In our case study (Country A), the administrative burden is separated into two 
distinct (but complementary) procedures: (1) the PSI procedure, and (2) the import customs 
clearance procedure. The timing of a classic import operation is given below:  
 
PSI process. The PSI process takes place in the country of embarkation. A non-binding 
completed form  the request for detailed information (RDI)  is sent to the PSI firm’s local 
office. Analysing the supporting documentation and the overall coherence of the RDI, the 
private company performs preliminary price verification. Then, based on a risk analysis, a 
proportion of shipments are subjected to a physical inspection.13 A report of findings (ROF) 
                                                 
10  Obviously, exploiting the internal information is beneficial if and only if the main characteristics of the product (the value-
to-quantity ratio, the unit value and bulkiness) are strongly correlated among import transactions. 
11  On this, see Bayer and Cowell (2016). 
12 The market structure is oligopolistic. Dequiedt et al. (2012) outline that SGS-BIVAC, INTERTEK and COTECNA account 
for more than 90% of the market. 
13  In some countries, goods are always physically inspected (e.g. Ghana and Togo). 
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stating the estimated customs value, quantities and tariff classification is issued.14 Notice that 
the WTO agreement on customs valuation (ACV)15 stipulates that the ROF can only be used 





Import customs clearance procedures. When the shipment is at the seaport/airport/land 
port of destination, the economic operator makes the customs declaration (themselves or by 
a representative, namely the customs broker).16 The necessary documents (the bill of lading, 
the commercial invoice, the ROF, etc.) are filed with customs. Obviously, the PSI-supplied 
information acts as an incentive for the economic operator to make an import declaration in 
accordance with the report of findings. Differences may arise in cases of dispute between the 
importer and the surveillance company, or collusion between the importer and the customs 
officer.17 From the results of risk analysis,18 a documentary check and/or a physical 
inspection may be carried out. Using the ACV methodology and the customs code, the key 
objectives of honest customs officers are then: (i) to correctly assess the customs value (unit 
price and quantities), and (ii) to verify the classification of goods. Based on the inspector's 
report, customs announce the amount of taxes and duties, and eventually penalties, to be 
paid.19 Once payment is complete, goods are released. The following diagram summarises 




1.2.2 The efficiency of PSI services: an open question 
 
Existing research on the evaluation of PSI programmes does not provide a clear response 
(see De Wulf and Sokol 2005; McLinden et al. 2011). Anson et al. (2006) studied four PSI 
programmes. The results are mixed. Their empirical results suggest that PSI may have no 
impact (Indonesia), reduce fraud (Philippines) or increase fraud (Argentina). Jean and 
Mitaritonna (2010) also find a heterogeneous effect. In particular, their results indicate that 
PSI programmes seem to be less efficient in least developed countries. Low (1995) argues 
that success depends on the details of the PSI contract. Yang (2008a) stresses that PSI 
programmes may create new forms of fraud, rather than curbing it. Studying the Philippines’ 
PSI programme, he shows that importers adapted their behaviour and found alternative ways 
to evade duty following the introduction of PSIs. By splitting up shipments to get a shipment's 
value below the minimum value threshold, or by importing via a duty-exempt export 
processing zone, bad practices continued. Nonetheless, switching to alternative methods 
became much more complex as corrective measures were set up. Finally, Yang (2008b) 
                                                 
14  The classification of goods is usually determined according to the harmonised system of classification issued by the 
World Customs Organization. For the sake of brevity, complaints and appeals procedures are not detailed in this paper. 
15  Available at <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/20-val_01_e.htm>. 
16  For further details on the declaration processing, see e.g. Keen (2003); Martincus et al. (2015); Fernandes et al. (2015). 
17  See Dequiedt et al. (2012). 
18  For more details on modern risk analysis techniques, see e.g. Geourjon and Laporte (2005, 2012). 
19  The customs inspection may fail to detect fraud - see e.g. Cariolle et al. (2016). Note also that, due to corruption, 
inspectors’ reports are sometimes incorrect - see e.g. Sequeira and Djankov (2014); Sequeira (2016). 
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outlines that, on average across countries, PSI programmes are associated with a decrease 
in underreporting, but these improvements do not appear to persist over time. Thus, PSI 
programmes may only have a short-term performance-enhancing effect. 
 
 
2  Empirical strategy 
 
2.1 Measure of underreporting 
 
Our measure of underreporting is the 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝.20 We define the 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 as the 
difference between the value of exports from each trade partner to Country A as reported by 
each trade partner, and the value of imports by Country A from each trade partner as 
reported by Country A. The logarithmic form aims to reduce the problem of non-normality of 
the distribution. Formally, we have: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑝𝑒 − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑝𝑒  (1) 
 
where Export valuepe is the value of exports of the HS 6-digit product p reported by Partner 
Country e to Country A and Import valuepe is the value of imports by Country A from the 
Partner Country e of the HS 6-digit product p. As indicated by Bhagwati (1964), a positive 
gap reveals an underreporting of imports.21 
 
2.2 Baseline specification 
 
2.2.1 Econometric specification 
 
We draw on Fisman and Wei (2004)'s specification. We augment their model by mainly 
adding (i) our key variables of interest, and (ii) some fixed effects (HS-2 industry - trade 
partner dummies). The following model is then obtained, 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛾 ln(# 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑝𝑒 + 𝜅𝑃𝑆𝐼 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑝𝑒 
   + 𝜎 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒 + 𝜁 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑝 + 𝐷𝑖𝑒 +  𝜀𝑝𝑒     (2) 
 
 
where 𝛾 and 𝜅 are our key parameters of interest, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒 is the measure of 
underreporting (as defined in eq.1) and 𝜀𝑝𝑒 is the error term. In order to remove potentially 
omitted variable bias, we include pairwise HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies 𝐷𝑖𝑒. These 
dummies control for all factors  whether observable or unobservable  that are constant 
over HS-6 products belonging to the same HS-2 industry i and coming from the same trade 
partner e. Following Fisman and Wei (2004), we cluster standard errors at the HS-4 digit 
level to account for potential heteroskedasticity.  
 
2.2.2 Variable quantifying the internal information available: 𝒍𝒏(# 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔) 
 
Following Section 1.1, we want to estimate the effect of the number of import declarations (in 
logarithm)  ln(# 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)  on evasion.22 If a negative relationship exists between our 
product-trade partner varying variable and evasion, it would suggest that the more frequently 
                                                 
20  See Fisman and Wei, (2004); Javorcik and Narciso (2008); Mishra et al. (2008); Jean and Mitaritonna (2010); Bouet and 
Roy (2012); Ferrantino et al. (2012); Rijkers et al. (2015); Worku et al. (2016), among others. 
21  The literature typically assumes that export declarations are compliant, since there are no longer taxes on exports. 
22  Notice that one import transaction tallies with one import declaration in our final dataset. 
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a product is imported, the more difficult it is for an importer to underreport the value of the 
good. Such an effect would probably not be attributable to the product's intrinsic 
characteristics because the latter is captured (to a large extent) by HS-2 industry-trade 
partner dummies and the Differentiated product variable (Section 2.2.4). Since the customs 
risk analysis conducted by the automated clearance system does not exploit historical data, 
we therefore argue that a negative correlation would suggest that customs officers use 
information contained in previous import declarations to determine the compliance of 
declarations. As any import declaration may be inspected in Country A, the informational 
component of previous import declarations is potentially systematically used.23  Due to 
potential large differences in countries' product quality (see e.g. Hallak and Schott 2011), it 
may be useless to compare the declared value of a product that has to be assessed with the 
declared value of a similar product coming from another trade partner. For instance, it is 
likely that obtaining information on the value of Chinese dresses does not really help to 
assess the value of a French dress. Therefore, our preferred proxy quantifying the available 
internal information only counts the number of import operations from the exporting country 
for each HS-6 product (and not from the world). We consider the number of import 
operations from the world in Appendix A. The information quality associated with this latter 
variable being probably lower, we expect a smaller negative coefficient. 
 
2.2.3 Variable quantifying the external information acquired: PSI frequency 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Country A uses the services of an information provider – a 
PSI company. Bear in mind that, at the point of embarkation, a company's employees have 
to (i) assess the transaction value, (ii) verify the quantity, and (iii) share their opinion through 
establishing a report of findings. Additional details of the local contract may be provided upon 
request. Exploiting the fact that PSIs are not systematic (see Section 2.2), we aim to 
estimate the relationship between the frequency of PSI and our evasion measure.24 If the PSI 
company provides useful information to customs, we expect that undervaluation will be 
mitigated for observations with high PSI rates. The potential endogeneity issue is discussed 
later.  
 
2.2.4 Control variables 
 
In our regressions, we control for the import taxation rate and the degree of differentiation of 
the product.  
 
Import taxation rate. Following Pritchett and Sethi (1994), we use collected taxes  the sum 
of duties, excises and VAT effectively paid  as our measure of revenue. Divided by the 
import value, we get the de facto tax rate (variable Taxes). De facto means that the rate is 
calculated from taxes effectively paid, and thus may differ from those mentioned in the 
customs code. Differences are due to granting preferential treatment. Some minor taxes  
the statistical tax25 and a regional integration tax  are not included, since reliable data is 
regretfully not available at the HS-6 product level. Note that σ is the semi-elasticity of evasion 
with respect to taxes. Fisman and Wei (2004) argue that tax differentials may create an 
incentive to misreport the classification of goods.26 The misreporting hypothesis is tested by 
including the average tariff on similar products in the econometric specification.  
  
                                                 
23  Since customs officers are allowed to re-route a declaration from a facilitation channel to an inspection channel in case 
of suspicion, any declaration may be physically inspected. However, such requests must be duly reasoned in order to 
prevent malpractice. 
24  Note that our final database indicates the fraction of imports submitted to a PSI for each HS6 product-trade partner. For 
further details, see Appendix C. 
25  The statistical tax is a tax imposed to raise customs' administration revenues - see Doe (2006). 
26  Chalendard et al. (2016) describe some misclassification techniques. 
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Degree of differentiation. Mishra et al. (2008) outline that the level of enforcement is product-
varying. To capture the degree of differentiation of product, we use the classification of 
Rauch (1999). Rauch (1999) defines a differentiated product as a good not having a 
reference price, or not quoted on an organised exchange.27 We conjecture that, due to the 
lack of a reference price, assessing the transaction value of differentiated products is much 
more difficult, which in turn makes deception easier. A higher evasion is thus expected for 
differentiated products.  
 
2.2.5 Endogeneity issue and potential bias  
 
Evasion may be estimated with measurement errors. Indeed, some discrepancies in trade 
statistics are due to factors other than tax evasion, such as statistical reasons  difference in 
(c.i.f - f.o.b) valuation (see Nitsch 2012), exchange rate conversion issues (see Carrère and 
Grigoriou 2014), unintentional misclassifications (see Jean and Mitaritonna 2010), or weak 
export control laws (see Stoyanov 2012). However, to the extent that measurement errors in 
the evasion measure are not related to the error term, the estimator remains unbiased (but 
less efficient, see Jean and Mitaritonna 2010). In the case of export subsidies granted by the 
trade partner, over-reporting of exports may arise. Nevertheless, under the reasonable 
assumption that export misreporting is not related to our independent variables, estimations 
are not biased.  
 
Country A is a member of a regional integration zone, so a common external tariff rate 
applies to Country A. The government is thus not able to modify tariffs according to tax 
evasion. For VAT, the general tax code sets out only two distinct VAT rates a general rate 
and a zero rate for basic necessities. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the government 
determines the VAT rate on the basis of customs evasion. 
 
As regard the PSI variable, the fact that shipments below a minimum value are exempted 
from private inspection may create an incentive to underreport. Yang (2008a) shows that this 
exemption was exploited by tax evaders at the beginning of the Philippine PSI programme. 
The usual strategy consists of declaring a value below the threshold to avoid a PSI. 
Graphical representations of cumulative distribution function of shipments with a value 
around the PSI threshold (see Figure 1) suggest that these fraudulent activities are not 
common. One remaining concern is that an effective PSI risk analysis implies that the riskiest 
import declarations are inspected more frequently. The PSI frequency variable may therefore 
be affected by the Trade gap. In such a situation, the error term ε is correlated with the PSI 
variable, meaning that the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) assumption is 
violated. Even if descriptive statistics suggest that, prima facie, endogeneity seems not to be 
an actual problem  PSIs are not more frequent for products with a larger gap  we choose 
to use an instrumental variable approach to deal with this potential reverse causation. Given 
our unit of analysis (HS6 product-partner level), and the fact that we rely on administrative 
data, it is hard to find a valid instrumental variable. However, we argue that the fraction/rate 
of import declarations handled by a specific customs office Office #1 seems to be a fairly 
good instrumental variable. This variable varies by HS6-product and trade partner. Office #1 
is the main customs clearance office of the main seaport of country A. It is worth mentioning 
that, according to the shipment's characteristics (notably the type of shipment and the 
container size), shipments (and so import declarations) are transmitted to the most 
appropriate customs local office. Guidance criteria are thus exclusively based on technical 
criteria. This means that Office #1's activity does not rely on any risk analysis. The customs 
office is fully specialised in the clearance of containerised imports for home use. Office #1 
therefore clears goods for which: (i) there is an incentive to cheat  contrary to other customs 
                                                 
27  Non-differentiated goods are reference priced goods or homogeneous goods - goods traded on an organised exchange. 
A typical example of a homogenous product is sugar. 
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procedures (temporary admission, inward processing, outward processing, etc.), taxes are 
charged for imports for home use; and (ii) there exists an ability to cheat compared to bulk 
imports, cheating is easier when imports are containerised. Due to the introduction of 
performance measurement contracts,28 performance of the main customs offices is now 
similar. This implies that cheating importers have no incentive to strategically import through 
a specific customs office in order to escape taxes and duties. In other words, it is unlikely that 
the fact that imported goods are released by Customs Office #1 has a specific effect on 
undervaluation. As a consequence, we argue that enforcement does not vary between 
customs offices.29 We therefore conjecture that the proposed instrument seems not to be 
correlated to fraud.  
 
 
Figure 1 Statistical distribution of shipments with a value close to the PSI minimum 
value, bandwidths: 0.5 x the minimum value (left) or 0.25 x the minimum value (right) 
Observation: Displayed graphical representations are quite linear and distributions have no real peak, suggesting that declaring 
shipment values below the threshold to avoid PSI is not a common practice. 
 
 
3  Data and descriptive overview 
 
3.1 Dataset  
 
The dataset is drawn from an export database and an import database. Country-
disaggregated export data is provided on an annual basis, and comes from the well-known 
UN COMTRADE database. Local customs have provided transaction-level import data. 
Interestingly, each customs declaration provides in-depth information including the HS-11 
digit product code, the customs office of entry, the presence of any attached administrative 
document (the report of findings), the date of registration, the exporting country, the declared 
value, the declared quantity and the declared weight. The import database is only formed by 
imports for home use  we have removed from the original dataset (i) transit operations to 
(landlocked) neighbouring countries, and (ii) temporary admissions. Since export data cannot 
be disaggregated beyond the 6-digit level, import data has been aggregated on a 6-digit 
basis. Import values are expressed in the local monetary unit. A conversion into US dollars 
has been performed using the exchange rate at the date of registration of the declaration. 
Exchange rate miscalculations are thus reduced. Since we consider the European Union as 
a single trade partner, the ‘Rotterdam effect’  differences in import and export reports due to 
the transit trade, see Herrigan et al. (2005)  is reduced. Trade partners that do not report 
                                                 
28  For more details on performance measurement contracts, see Cantens et al. (2014). 
29  Except for land border offices. Although land border customs offices are less efficient, it is worth mentioning that only 
3% of declarations are cleared by a land border customs office. A robustness check addresses the concern related to 
the trade across land borders. 
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their exports to UN COMTRADE (e.g. Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates and 
neighbouring countries) are excluded from the sample. Due to important variations in the 
local nomenclature used in recent years, our study covers only one year (2013). Main 
explanatory variables have been obtained from the Information Technology department, local 
customs. Appendix C provides a full list of variables, definitions and sources.  
 
In order to assess the quality of our database, we rely, as Mishra et al. (2008), on the match 
rate between imports and exports. This ratio is defined as the number of observations for 
which a non-zero export and a non-zero import are registered, divided by the total number of 
observations (unit of analysis: HS6 product-trade partner level). The average match rate is 
quite large (66 per cent) indicating that data seems to be reliable.30 The rate is slightly higher 
than in Van Dunem and Arndt (2009) (55 per cent) and Mishra et al. (2008) (65 per cent). 
Table 1 presents the corresponding match rate for the top ten partners. It is noteworthy that 
the coverage is particularly strong for the European Union (91 per cent). Non-matched 
observations are removed from our final dataset. The sample then contains 52 trade partners 
and 3,085 products. The number of exported HS6 products per country is displayed in Table 
6, Appendix A.  
 
Table 1 Match rates across main trade partners 
Country name Share of HS6 products that are in 
both databases (%)   
European Union 91 
China 86 
United States 87 
India 57 





Republic of Korea 62 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the data used, in which each observation is at the 
HS-6 product-trade partner level. For dummy variables, the mean is those observations for 
which the variable is equal to one. Our sample has 8,749 observations. With no evasion, we 
expect a negative gap due to the c.i.f-f.o.b margin. However, observe that both mean and 
median of Trade gap are positive. This feature supports the hypothesis that tax evasion is 
quite widespread. Note that these discrepancies are larger than in Tanzania (mean: 0.004, 
see Levin and Widell 2014) but lower than in Mozambique (mean: 0.290, see Van Dunem 
and Arndt 2009) and Kenya (mean: 0.724, see Levin and Widell 2014). Finally, observe that 
over 25 per cent of the discrepancies are negative (p25<0, row 4), suggesting that some 










                                                 
30  As in Mishra et al. (2008), the average match rate is weighted by the number of traded products. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
    Mean   Median   Min    Max    SD    p5    p25    p75    p95   Observation  
Ln(Export value) 10.13 10.29 0.00 18.94 2.84 5.08 8.29 12.13 14.50  8,749  
Ln(Import value) 9.94 10.06 -1.87 18.81 2.78 5.26 8.08 11.89 14.36  8,749   
Trade gap 0.19 0.07 -11.24 11.81 2.24 -3.51 -0.88 1.26 4.05  8,749  
PSI frequency  0.64 0.72 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.36 1.00 1.00  8,749  
 Ln(# imports)  1.98 1.79 0.00 9.29 1.60 0.00 0.69 3.06 4.96  8,749  
 Ln(# imports from the world)  4.40 4.43 0.00 9.57 1.78 1.39 3.14 5.75 7.19  8,749  
Taxes  0.31 0.29 0.00 6.56 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.49 0.58  8,749  
Differentiated product  0.83 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  7,073  
Summary statistics for the dependent variable 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) and for the independent 
variables. Please refer to Appendix C for a detailed definition of these variables. SD is standard deviation, p stands for 
percentile in this table. Observations are at the HS 6 product-trade partner level. Such high maximal taxation rate is explained 
by the presence of products subject to compound tariffs (a combination of ad valorem and specific tariffs). In a robustness 
check, we exclude from the sample products subject to an administrative value.  
 
The distribution of our measure of underreporting is fairly normally distributed (see Figure 2). 
Therefore, we can perform a Pearson's correlation to assess the relationship between our 
dependent variable (Trade gap) and our regressors,31 see Table 3. Prima facie, the number 
of import operations appears to mitigate underreporting. The correlation coefficient between 
the proxy for customs fraud and PSIs is not significant. Nevertheless, notice that correlation 
is not causality, since correlation only quantifies the extent to which two variables go 
together. The positive and significant linear correlation between Taxes and the Trade gap 
supports the hypothesis of tax evasion. Large rates are associated with large gaps. Evasion 
seems to be more prevalent for differentiated products. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that 
none of the pairwise correlation coefficients between two explanatory variables are in 
absolute value greater than 0.8 (the high correlation threshold usually recognised),32 
indicating that there is no multicolinearity between any two explanatory variables. Finally, 
note that our instrument is strongly and positively correlated with PSI frequency  the 
Pearson's correlation coefficient is positive (0.701) and significant at 1 per cent, but 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable  the coefficient (0.015) is not significant at 1 per 
cent. Thus, the fraction of import declarations handled by the main customs clearance office 
(Office #1) appears to be a plausible instrument (relevant and exogenous).  
 
 
Figure 2 Density distribution of the Trade gap 
                                                 
31  Note that the Pearson's correlation coefficient is a measure of linear relationship. Therefore, a not significant value does 
not imply that there is no relationship between the variables. 




 Table 3 Pearson's correlations 
Variable   Trade gap   Taxes   PSI frequency   Ln(# imports)  Differentiated product   
Taxes  0.137***  1.000             
PSI frequency  0.007 0.346***  1.000        
Ln(# imports)  -0.224***  0.000  -0.037***  1.000   
Differentiated product   0.040***   0.040***   -0.144***   0.067***  1.000 
Notes: 
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). 
(iii) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1% , **5%, and *10% level. For further details, please see the text. 
 
 
4  Results and robustness 
 
4.1 Basic results 
 
We estimate Equation 2. The regression results are displayed in Table 4. We use a number 
of dummy variables to ensure a robust econometric identification. Column (2) includes trade 
partner dummies. The inclusion of trade partner dummies captures any individual partner 
characteristic, such as the geographical distance or differences in the quality of export 
monitoring. Column (3) adds HS-2 industry dummies. Industry dummies Di take into account 
the unobserved heterogeneity across industries  determinants of gaps not industry-varying. 
Column (4) replaces trade partner and HS-2 industry dummies with couple dummies  HS-2 
industry-trade partner dummies. Regression 4 is more refined relative to other regressions as 
it controls for industry-trade partner characteristics.  
 
Effect of our key variables of interest. The negative coefficient on PSI frequency suggests 
that PSIs reduce evasion. The coefficient is quite stable across specifications. Quantitatively, 
Column (4) indicates that a 1 per cent increase in PSIs leads to a reduction of approximately 
0.36 per cent of discrepancies in trade statistics. Notice that this estimated ordinary least 
squares (OLS) coefficient may be biased due to endogeneity. Two stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimates highlight that the downward bias is substantial. Although these results per 
se do not justify contracting with a PSI firm,33 they show that relying on an information 
provider seems to reduce the importer's incentive to cheat.  
 
As for the ln(# imports) variable, Column (4) outlines that every 1 per cent increase in the 
number of import declarations results in 0.41 per cent decline in evasion. This estimate is 
consistent with the hypothesis that customs officers use information they have learned from 
similar import declarations to better assess the import value. Notice that the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the (natural logarithm of the) number of import declarations from the world 
Ln(# imports from the world) is half (-0.2, see results in Table 9, Appendix A). This result 
suggests that the informational component of historical data (previous import declarations) 
seems to increase with the relevance of data used.  
 
Effect of other explanatory variables. Control variables are significant with the expected 
sign. Clearly, the estimated semi-elasticity of underreporting with respect to taxes is positive 
and significant. Our estimates outline that 1 per cent increase in taxes (tariff, excise and 
VAT) leads to about 1.55 per cent increase in evasion, see Column (4).34 The estimate is 
                                                 
33  A cost-benefit analysis would be necessary to draw any conclusions concerning the PSI effectiveness. 







slightly larger than that found for Mozambique (1.38 per cent, see Van Dunem and Arndt 
2009) but lower than the estimate of Tanzania (2.36 per cent, see Levin and Widell 2014). 
The coefficient associated to the Differentiated product dummy is significant and positive, 
indicating that the quality of enforcement is product-varying. This result confirms that 
cheating is easier when the price is not well known. Enforcement is thus weaker for 
differentiated products.35 
 
Endogeneity issues: IV approach. To address the potential endogeneity of PSI frequency, 
we use the instrumental variable approach. First-stage regression results support the 
instrument relevance (see Table 7, Appendix A). The coefficient of the instrument is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. It is noteworthy that Office #1 frequency 
explains about 50 per cent of the variance of the PSI variable. To test the instrument 
exogeneity, we conduct a statistical test. Precisely, we regress the Trade gap on the Office 
#1 frequency. The coefficient is not significant, indicating that it is unlikely that the exclusion 
restriction is violated.36 
 
The results of the IV estimation  second stage regressions  are displayed in Columns (5)-
(8), Table 4.37 The qualitative nature of our results is unaffected. Instrumenting for the 
potential endogeneity of PSI frequency, the magnitude of the PSI coefficient is, as expected 
and in absolute terms, larger than in the OLS estimations. Specifically, instrumental variable 
estimations outline that 1 per cent increase in PSIs reduce trade statistics discrepancies by 
0.69 per cent, see Column (8), Table 4.  
 
Factors reducing customs fraud: independent, substitute or complementary? To test 
whether the combination of our two variables of interest is associated with a lower gap, we 
introduce the multiplicative variable PSI frequency x Ln(#imports). The associated coefficient 
is not significant. We interpret this result as evidence that the economic operator fully adjusts 
their import declaration to the report of findings (see timing in Section 1.2). This behaviour 
explains why PSI-supplied information seems not to be useful for the customs officer. This 
importer's response is in line with Carrillo et al. (forthcoming)'s findings. Empirical results are 
omitted due to space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        









Observe that, as in Fisman and Wei (2004), this reduced form highlights that increasing taxes may induce a negative 
value effect  a decline of exports to Country A, see the first term, and a negative compliance effect  the fraction of true 
imports reported to local customs is reduced, see the second term (-𝜎). 
Misclassification of imported goods  mislabelling a higher-taxed product as a lower-taxed similar product  may be a 
useful strategy to evade taxes. To test for misreporting, we follow Fisman and Wei (2004), and we add the average tax 
rate of the HS-4 digit category as an additional regressor. As in Levin and Widell (2014) for Tanzania, we find no hard 
evidence of evasion by misclassification within 4-digit classifications (results are not reported but they are available 
upon request). It suggests that understating import value at customs clearance seems to be the main channel of 
evasion. Notice that, due to our specific targets, products that illegally enter the territory are systematically excluded 
from the final sample. Smuggling is therefore not considered in this paper. 
35  Contrary to Mishra et al. (2008), the effect of this ‘ease-of-enforcement’ measure seems to be linear; results are 
available upon request. 
36  For the sake of brevity, results are not reported. They are obviously available upon request. 
37  Note that first-stage F statistics  Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistics  indicate that the instrument is not weak. Kleibergen-
Paap Wald statistics are much greater than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 16.38, suggesting that the 
assumption of weak identification is rejected. Notice that, in this study of a single endogenous regressor, the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald statistics are the heteroskedasticity-robust first-stage F statistics. 
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  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  
PSI frequency   -0.209**   -0.287***   -0.324***   -0.356***   -0.304*   -0.502***   -0.611***   -0.694***  
 
(0.106)  (0.101)  (0.114)  (0.134)  (0.163)  (0.170)  (0.190)  (0.206)  
Ln(# imports)   -0.316***   -0.419***   -0.417***   -0.414***   -0.316***   -0.420***   -0.417***   -0.414***  
 
(0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)  
Taxes   1.404***   1.549***   1.486***   1.553***   1.454***   1.653***   1.616***   1.710***  
 
(0.197)  (0.209)  (0.265)  (0.297)  (0.220)  (0.235)  (0.293)  (0.314)  
Differentiated product   0.265***   0.370***  0.149  0.210*   0.251***   0.338***  0.130 0.189 
 
(0.070)  (0.074)  (0.114)  (0.124)  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.112)  (0.115)  
Constant   0.290***  0.368 0.239  0.578***   0.348***   0.569*  0.0717  1.514***  
 
(0.103)  (0.315)  (0.315)  (0.148)  (0.124)  (0.338)  (0.420)  (0.197)  
Trade partner dummies        Yes    Yes              Yes    Yes     
HS-2 industry dummies             Yes                   Yes     
Couple dummies                  Yes                   Yes  
Estimator   OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS    2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   2SLS  
Observations  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073   7,073  
R-squared  0.071 0.119 0.135 0.266 0.071 0.119 0.134 0.264 
Adjusted R-squared  0.071 0.113 0.117 0.158 0.071 0.112 0.116 0.156 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). 
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products.  
(iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(v) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 
(vi) OLS is Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS is Two Stage Least Squares. 
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
 
4.2.1 Preliminary sensitivity analysis 
 
As discrepancies in bilateral trade data may be due to measurement errors rather than 
customs fraud, we run regressions including only observations with large gaps – 
observations for which the discrepancy accounts for, in absolute value, more than 5 per cent, 
10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent, or 25 per cent of the export value. Estimated 
coefficients remain essentially unchanged. Regression results are given in Table 8, Appendix 
A. 
 
4.2.2 Robustness checks using alternative proxies quantifying the internal information 
available 
 
Use of a proxy independent of the cif-fob ratio. Since exports are expressed f.o.b and 
imports are expressed c.i.f, interpretations so far have been based on the assumption that 
the number of import operations does not impact the 
𝑐𝑖𝑓
𝑓𝑜𝑏






= 0. Yet, it 
cannot be ruled out that the number of import operations affect transport costs. In particular, 
in a situation where importers voluntarily choose to split purchases into many 
transactions/shipments  due to liquidity constraints, for instance  transport costs are then 




Equation 3 outlines that the derivative of the Trade gap is the sum of derivatives of (i) the 
Quantity gap, (ii) the Unit value gap and (iii) the 
𝑐𝑖𝑓
𝑓𝑜𝑏



































As stressed above, if a relationship between Ln(# imports) and the 
𝑐𝑖𝑓
𝑓𝑜𝑏
 factor exists, then the 
estimated marginal effect differs from the specific impact of the number of import 




factor-varying dependent variable. To this end, we focus on discrepancies in volume.39 Given 
that the unit of measurement for the supplementary quantity is product-varying (item, litre, 
meter, etc.), we use the net weight  always expressed in kilograms  as our quantity 
variable. Following the Trade gap, we define the Weight gap as follows: 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝 =
ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡). 
 
Based on Equation 2, the following equation is then estimated: 
 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒 = 𝛼𝑤 + 𝛾𝑤 ln(# 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑝𝑒 + 𝜅𝑤𝑃𝑆𝐼 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑝𝑒 
      + 𝜎𝑤 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒 + 𝜁𝑤 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑝 + 𝐷𝑖𝑒+ 𝑢𝑝𝑒  (4) 
 
where 𝑢𝑝𝑒 is the error term and subscript w stands for the Weight gap specification. 
 
Assessing accurately the quantity may be a difficult task, especially when goods are 
containerised and/or in case of large shipments. Accumulating information, knowledge about 
the usual weight and the usual bulkiness may therefore help the customs officer in 
determining quantities imported. Thus, we expect that 𝛾𝑤<0. Given that PSI companies have 
to produce a detailed assessment of quantities shipped, a negative relationship between the 
PSI frequency and underreporting of quantities is also expected.  
 
Table 5 displays the results. The coefficient on the Ln(#imports) variable slightly changes. 
Results also reiterate the role played by PSIs in reducing underreporting. Furthermore, 
estimates highlight that quantity-based evasion increases with taxes. As observed in 
previous estimations (see Table 4), when we include HS-2 industry dummies, the coefficient 
associated with the product differentiation variable is not significant due to a lack of intra-
industry variability. 
 
                                                 
38  The proof is available upon request. 
39  Bear in mind that, by definition, cheating on the total value implies cheating on the volume (quantity) and/or on the unit 
value (as total value=quantities x unit value). 
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  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  
PSI frequency   -0.491***   -0.509***   -0.615***   -0.661***   -0.702***   -0.750***   -1.081***   -1.218***  
 
(0.107)  (0.112)  (0.122)  (0.146)  (0.178)  (0.186)  (0.202)  (0.230)  
Ln(# imports)   -0.337***   -0.420***   -0.418***   -0.414***   -0.338***   -0.421***   -0.417***   -0.414***  
 
(0.019)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
Taxes   0.536***   0.680***   0.429**   0.418**   0.645***   0.795***   0.638***   0.673***  
 
(0.154)  (0.161)  (0.183)  (0.202)  (0.175)  (0.184)  (0.216)  (0.231)  
Differentiated product   -0.306***   -0.189**  -0.074 0.023  -0.337***   -0.225***  -0.104 -0.013 
 
(0.083)  (0.084)  (0.127)  (0.139)  (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.125)  (0.130)  
Constant   0.767***   1.062***   0.608**   2.505***   0.899***   0.606***  -1.752 -1.215 
  (0.116)  (0.278)  (0.286)  (0.171)  (0.146)  (0.198)  (2.008)  (1.978)  
Trade partner dummies        Yes    Yes              Yes    Yes     
HS-2 industry dummies             Yes                   Yes     
Couple dummies                  Yes                   Yes  
Estimator   OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS    2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   2SLS  
Observations   6,836   6,836   6,836   6,836   6,836   6,836   6,836   6,836  
R-squared  0.053 0.084 0.114 0.243 0.053 0.083 0.112 0.240 
Adjusted R-squared  0.053 0.077 0.095 0.131 0.052 0.076 0.093 0.128 
 Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡). 
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products.  
(iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(v) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 
(vi) OLS is Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS is Two Stage Least Squares. 
 
Use of an alternative proxy. In this subsection, we wish to test the robustness of our 
findings to the use of an alternative proxy aiming to quantify the internal information 
available. We use a less disaggregated variable. Specifically, we use the number of trade 
partners exporting the HS6-product to Country A. This novel proxy also aims at capturing the 
customs officer's knowledge of the product. The underlying assumption is that, the more an 
HS6-product is exported by a large number of trading partners, the more the customs officer 
has information on the product's characteristics (e.g. the usual unit value, the usual unit 
weight, etc.). Not surprisingly, this variable is highly correlated with the number of import 
declarations from the world.40 Figure 3 illustrates the strong uphill positive relationship. 
Results confirm previous findings, see Columns (1)-(2), Table 10, Appendix B. Estimates 
outline that the entry of a new supplier country lowers underreporting by 3.2 per cent (see 
Column 2, Table 10, Appendix B).  
 
                                                 
40  The Pearson's correlation coefficient between these two variables is high and positive (0.867) and significant at 1%. The 
correlation coefficient between the number of import declarations from the trade partner (in logarithm) and the number of 




Figure 3 A positive relationship between the # of exporting countries and the (ln)# of 
imports from the world 
 
Overall, these various robustness checks indicate that there is a negative association 
between our proxies quantifying the internal information available and tax evasion. We argue 
that this relationship is due to the fact that officers exploit customs’ internal information (use 
their prior experience) to better assess the compliance of import declarations. 
 
4.2.3 Further robustness checks 
 
We validate previous findings through a number of additional robustness checks. Results are 
reported in Table 10 in Appendix B. In Columns (3)-(4), we use the Rauch classification of 
goods based on the liberal definition instead of the conservative definition. Next, in order to 
increase the sample size, we exclude from regressors the differentiation variable (Columns 
(5)-(6)). As for the Weight gap specification, previous findings are also confirmed (see Table 
12, Appendix B). 
 
We also check whether results remain robust across various sample restrictions. In Table 11 
(Appendix B), the sample is restricted by successively removing (i) products subject to 
specific tariffs, (ii) HS-2 industries for which customs valuation is typically difficult (worn 
clothing, textile, mineral fuels, mineral oils, miscellaneous manufactured articles, art, 
collectors' pieces and antiques)41 and (iii) potential outliers (first and last 0.05 quantile). Table 
13 (Appendix B) presents regression results for the Weight gap specification. Estimated 
coefficients remain essentially unchanged.42 
 
A final concern with our empirical estimates is related to intra-regional trade. As neighbouring 
countries do not report their exports to UN COMTRADE, intra-regional transactions are 
excluded from the sample. If the biggest tax evaders have a strategy that consists of 
importing through customs offices where enforcement is quite weak  through land ports  
then we underestimate the semi-elasticy of evasion. However, it is noteworthy that 
implementing such a strategy may actually induce little (or no) benefit since intra-regional 
transport costs are high due to a lack of road infrastructure and poor trade logistics. To test 
whether this (potential) tax evasion strategy may change our results, we remove all HS-6 
products having been imported at least once through a land border.43 This sample restriction 
                                                 
41  We exclude the following HS-2 chapters: 61, 62, 63, 94, 95, 96, 97. 
42  Notice that results also hold to the exclusion of African trade partners, for which reports are probably quite inaccurate. 
Results are available upon request. 
43  Keep in mind that, since informal cross-border trade is not recorded by local customs, we are unfortunately not able to 
precisely identify HS-6 products coming informally. 
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yields similar results in terms of magnitude of coefficients and significance levels (see 
Columns (13)-(14), Tables 11 and 13). 44  
 
 
5  Conclusion and policy implications 
This micro-level study contributes to the literature on evasion mainly by identifying factors 
reducing (customs) fraud in developing countries. We first provide suggestive evidence that 
the more frequently a product is imported, the stronger the tax enforcement. Estimates 
indicate that 1 per cent increase in the number of import declarations implies a 0.41 per cent 
decline in evasion. We argue that this negative correlation is indicative of the fact that in the 
field customs officers use information contained in previous import declarations to determine 
the compliance of declarations. Further, results show that PSI programmes significantly 
reduce observed trade statistics discrepancies. These findings are supported by a variety of 
robustness checks. 
 
From an operational perspective, this paper suggests that revenue-collection authorities 
should exploit ‘non-usual’ sources of information to improve their performance. In particular, 
authorities should internalise the inspectors’ experience. To this end, they should modernise 
their risk analysis system in order to fully exploit the informational component of historical 
data. This study also shows that relying on an (ideally free) information provider may be a 
valuable help in reaching the revenue collection target. As stressed by Zucman (2013), in tax 
matters a powerful free information provider may entail setting up an automatic system to 
exchange information between customs authorities. 
  
                                                 





Appendix A Supplementary tables 
 
Table 6 Number of observations per country 
Country name # observations Country name # observations 
Algeria 2 Mauritius 2 
Argentina 11 Mexico 38 
Australia 15 Namibia 5 
Belarus 4 New Zealand 7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 Norway 55 
Brazil 102 Oman 3 
Cambodia 2 Pakistan 30 
Canada 197 Peru 6 
Chile 7 Republic of Korea 187 
China 1,678 Russian Federation 35 
Colombia 6 Saudi Arabia 10 
Costa Rica 8 Serbia and Montenegro 1 
European Union 2,837 Singapore 126 
Georgia 1 South Africa 469 
Ghana 28 Sri Lanka 6 
Guatemala 7 Switzerland 244 
Hong Kong 73 Taiwan 115 
India 532 Thailand 130 
Indonesia 107 Tunisia 92 
Israel 26 Turkey 397 
Japan 130 United Republic Of Tanzania 7 
Jordan 2 United States 711 
Kuwait 1 Uruguay 3 
Lebanon 128 Vietnam 67 
Madagascar 3 Yemen 2 















Table 7 First stage regressions 
Variables   PSI frequency   PSI frequency   PSI frequency   PSI frequency   PSI frequency  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
Office #1 frequency   0.634***   0.585***   0.626***   0.579***   0.588***  
 
(0.017)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.018)  
Ln'(# of imports)       -0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.001 
 
     (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Taxes        0.171***   0.179***   0.222***   0.229***  
 
     (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.045)  
Differentiated product        -0.036***   -0.028***  -0.010 -0.019 
 
     (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.017)  
Constant  0.344***   0.345***   0.409***   0.405***   0.309***  
 
(0.016)  (0.014)  (0.065)  (0.053)  (0.020)  
Trade partner dummies             Yes    Yes     
HS-2 industry dummies                  Yes     
Couple dummies                       Yes  
Estimator   OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS  
Observations   8,749   7,073   7,073   7,073   7,073  
R-squared  0.491 0.492 0.518 0.604 0.677 
Adjusted R-squared  0.491 0.492 0.514 0.596 0.630 
 Notes:  
 (i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level 
 (ii) The dependent variable is PSI frequency. Please refer to the Appendix C for a detailed definition. 
 (iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products.  
 (iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 


























  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
PSI frequency  -0.340** -0.511*** -0.342** -0.534*** -0.353** -0.548*** -0.349** -0.535*** -0.364** -0.554*** 
 
(0.137) (0.188) (0.140) (0.194) (0.146) (0.199) (0.151) (0.204) (0.155) (0.209) 
Ln(# imports) -0.426*** -0.412*** -0.438*** -0.424*** -0.451*** -0.436*** -0.470*** -0.454*** -0.484*** -0.468*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) 
Taxes  1.587*** 1.641*** 1.599*** 1.671*** 1.632*** 1.700*** 1.665*** 1.719*** 1.694*** 1.753*** 
 
(0.310) (0.289) (0.319) (0.299) (0.334) (0.311) (0.348) (0.321) (0.362) (0.334) 
Differentiated 
product  
0.230* 0.214* 0.264** 0.246** 0.280** 0.262** 0.260* 0.243* 0.268* 0.250* 
 
(0.127) (0.118) (0.129) (0.119) (0.134) (0.123) (0.141) (0.129) (0.152) (0.140) 
Constant  0.567*** 0.665*** 0.559*** 0.660*** 0.568*** 0.669*** 0.606*** 0.718*** 0.620*** 0.732*** 
 
(0.152) (0.186) (0.154) (0.188) (0.160) (0.193) (0.166) (0.200) (0.176) (0.209) 
Couple 
dummies  





5% 5% 10% 10% 15% 15% 20% 20% 25% 25% 
Estimator  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Observations  6,857 6,857 6,655 6,655 6,439 6,439 6,194 6,194 5,966 5,966 
R-squared  0.272 0.245 0.277 0.249 0.280 0.253 0.287 0.259 0.293 0.264 
Adjusted R-
squared  
0.163 0.150 0.166 0.153 0.168 0.155 0.174 0.161 0.177 0.164 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒).  
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products.  
(iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(v) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 




Table 9 Robustness check: Ln(# imports from the world) 
Variables  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  
PSI frequency   -0.235**   -0.343***   -0.383***   -0.392***   -0.298*   -0.604***   -0.704***   -0.755***  
 
(0.105)  (0.106)  (0.118)  (0.136)  (0.166)  (0.178)  (0.198)  (0.211)  
Ln(# imports from the 
world)  
 -0.211***   -0.245***   -0.232***   -0.227***   -0.212***   -0.249***   -0.234***   -0.229***  
 
(0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018)  
Taxes   1.487***   1.557***   1.494***   1.537***   1.521***   1.684***   1.641***   1.707***  
 
(0.201)  (0.218)  (0.280)  (0.304)  (0.223)  (0.249)  (0.313)  (0.323)  
Differentiated product   0.466***   0.420***  0.165 0.207  0.458***   0.385***  0.147 0.185 
 
(0.078)  (0.079)  (0.118)  (0.127)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.115)  (0.118)  
Constant   0.416***   0.876***   0.819***   0.785***   0.457***   1.136***   0.846**   1.940***  
 
(0.112)  (0.220)  (0.248)  (0.156)  (0.130)  (0.253)  (0.343)  (0.201)    
Trade partner dummies        Yes    Yes              Yes    Yes      
HS-2 industry dummies             Yes                   Yes      
Couple dummies                  Yes                   Yes  
Estimator   OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS    2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   2SLS  
Observations   7,073   7,073   7,073   7,073   7,073   7,073   7,073  7,073  
R-squared  0.045 0.077 0.094 0.231 0.045 0.076 0.092 0.230 
Adjusted R-squared  0.045 0.070 0.075 0.118 0.045 0.069 0.074 0.116 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒).  
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products.  
(iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(v) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 




Appendix B Additional robustness checks 
 
Table 10 Robustness checks, continuation 
Variables   Trade gap   Trade gap   Trade gap   Trade gap   Trade gap   Trade gap  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
PSI frequency   -0.410***   -0.748***   -0.356***   -0.690***   -0.450***   -0.725***  
 
(0.136)  (0.210)  (0.134)  (0.206)  (0.115)  (0.176)  
Quantity of internal 
information available  
 -0.031***   -0.032***   -0.416***   -0.416***   -0.414***   -0.415***  
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017)  
Taxes   1.475***   1.633***   1.532***   1.687***   1.702***   1.837***  
 
(0.292)  (0.310)  (0.296)  (0.313)  (0.268)  (0.279)  
Differentiated product  0.160 0.142  0.241**   0.229**         
 
(0.126)  (0.117)  (0.116)  (0.108)         
Constant   -0.784***   1.545***   2.207***   1.488***   -7.172***   1.630***  
  (0.136)  (0.195)  (0.147)  (0.187)  (1.239)  (0.161)  
Couple dummies   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes  
Alternative internal 
information variable  
 Yes    Yes                    
Differentiated product: liberal 
definition  
           Yes    Yes          
No differentiation variable                       Yes    Yes  
Estimator   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS  
Observations   7,073   7,073   7,073   7,073   8,749   8,749  
R-squared  0.222 0.221 0.266 0.265 0.262 0.261 
Adjusted R-squared  0.108 0.106 0.158 0.156 0.167 0.166 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒).  
(iii) Quantity of internal information available: # of exporting countries (columns (1) and (2) or Ln(# imports) (columns (3)-(6)). 
(iv) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products. 
(v) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(vi) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 




Table 11 Robustness checks, restricted sample 
Variables  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap  Trade gap Trade gap  Trade gap  
  (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
PSI frequency   -0.506***   -0.982***   -0.529***   -0.945***   -0.200**   -0.401***   -0.314**   -0.596***  
 
(0.127)  (0.198)  (0.132)  (0.209)  (0.090)  (0.146) (0.145)  (0.216)  
Ln(# imports)   -0.393***   -0.393***   -0.399***   -0.400***   -0.255***   -0.255***  -0.441***   -0.439***  
 
(0.020)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.023)  
Taxes   2.157***   2.455***   2.171***   2.434***   1.021***   1.116***   1.486***   1.613***  
 
(0.192)  (0.197)  (0.195)  (0.202)  (0.140)  (0.151)  (0.331)  (0.344)  
Differentiated product  0.170 0.136 0.169 0.138  0.178**   0.165**  0.177 0.165 
 
(0.126)  (0.117)  (0.125)  (0.117)  (0.088)  (0.082)  (0.138)  (0.129)  
Constant   -0.376*   1.122***   -9.522***  0.101  1.429***   1.770***   0.671***   1.611***  
 
(0.192)  (0.151)  (0.912)  (0.155)  (0.105)  (0.113) (0.166)  (0.221)  
Couple dummies   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes  
Excluding specific 
tariffs  
 Yes    Yes                            
Excluding sensitive 
HS-2 industry  
           Yes    Yes                 
Excluding first and last 
0.05 quantile  
                     Yes    Yes         
Excluding HS6 
products imported from 
a neighbouring country  
                            Yes    Yes   
Estimator   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS   OLS   2SLS  
Observations   6,683   6,683   6,226   6,226   6,367   6,367   5,723   5,723  
R-squared  0.264 0.261 0.258 0.256 0.232 0.231 0.257 0.256 
Adjusted R-squared  0.153 0.149 0.151 0.149 0.111 0.110 0.142 0.141 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒).  
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products. 
(iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(v) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 




Table 12 Robustness checks, Weight gap 
Variables  Weight gap  Weight gap  Weight gap  Weight gap  Weight gap  Weight gap  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
PSI frequency   -0.714***   -1.269***   -0.663***   -1.219***   -0.743***   -1.164***  
 
(0.149)  (0.233)  (0.145)  (0.230)  (0.127)  (0.198)  
Quantity of internal information 
available  
 -0.029***   -0.031***   -0.413***   -0.413***   -0.414***   -0.414***  
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.020)  
Taxes   0.338*   0.595***   0.422**   0.678***   0.376**   0.580***  
 
(0.202)  (0.230)  (0.204)  (0.234)  (0.180)  (0.199)  
Differentiated product  -0.037 -0.066 -0.015 -0.034        
 
 (0.140)  (0.130)  (0.148)  (0.140)         
Constant   0.683***  -1.796  2.504***  -1.194  -2.791***  -1.240 
 
(0.149)  (2.170)  (0.170)  (1.979)  (0.845) (1.978)  
Couple dummies  Yes   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes  
Alternative internal information variable  Yes   Yes                    
Differentiated product: liberal definition              Yes    Yes          
No differentiation variable                        Yes    Yes  
Estimator   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS  
Observations   6,836   6,836   6,836   6,836   8,431   8,431  
R-squared  0.207 0.204 0.243 0.240 0.238 0.236 
Adjusted R-squared  0.090 0.086 0.131 0.128 0.138 0.135 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡). 
(iii) Quantity of internal information available: # of exporting countries (columns (1) and (2) or Ln(# imports) (columns (3)-(6)). 
(iv) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products. 
(v) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(vi) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 






















  (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  (11)  (12) (13)  (14)  
PSI frequency  -0.765***   -1.400***   -0.751***   -1.369***   -0.399***   -0.739***   -0.664***   -1.133***  
 
(0.148)  (0.239)  (0.156)  (0.250)  (0.101)  (0.158)  (0.160)  (0.243)  
Ln(# imports)   -0.382***   -0.383***   -0.384***   -0.384***   -0.222***   -0.222***   -0.450***   -0.447***  
 
(0.023)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.027)  
Taxes  0.510**   0.905***   0.593***   0.981***  0.194  0.351**   0.440*   0.649**  
 
(0.219)  (0.235)  (0.228)  (0.245)  (0.132)  (0.139)  (0.228)  (0.255)  
Differentiated product  0.021 -0.025 -0.001 -0.046 0.006 -0.019 -0.001 -0.022 
 
(0.143)  (0.134)  (0.140)  (0.131)  (0.098)  (0.093) (0.157)  (0.146)  
Constant  -0.364**  -1.211  2.475***   1.467***   -2.264***  0.686  0.885***  -1.175 
 
(0.158)  (1.972)  (0.185)  (0.179)  (0.624)  (1.524) (0.191)  (1.976)  
Couple dummies   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes  
Excluding specific 
tariffs  
 Yes    Yes                            
Excluding sensitive 
HS-2 industry  
           Yes    Yes                 
Excluding first and last 
0.05 quantile  
                     Yes    Yes         
Excluding HS6 
products imported from 
a neighbouring country  
                            Yes    Yes  
Estimator   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS   OLS    2SLS  
Observations   6,451   6,451   6,000   6,000   6,146   6,146   5,523  5,523  
R-squared  0.239 0.235 0.234 0.231 0.218 0.215 0.242 0.239 
Adjusted R-squared  0.124 0.119 0.123 0.119 0.093 0.09 0.123 0.121 
Notes:  
(i) Observations are at the HS-6 product-trade partner level. 
(ii) The dependent variable is 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) − ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡). 
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by HS-4 products. 
(iv) Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. 
(v) Couple dummies: HS-2 industry-trade partner dummies. 




Appendix C Variable definitions 
 
Differentiated product: Equals one if the HS6-product is not traded on an organised market or 
listed in a trade publication. Conservative definition (if not specified). Source: Rauch (1999) 
classification of goods.  
   
Office #1 frequency: At the HS-6 product-trade partner level, the fraction of import 
declarations handled by Customs Office #1. Computed from information on the customs 
office of entry provided by the IT department, local customs.  
 
Export value: Value of exports (US dollars) by the trade partner to country A at the HS 6-digit 
HS level. The nomenclature is HS 2012. Source: UN COMTRADE.  
   
Import value: Value of imports (US dollars) from the trade partner into country A at the HS 6-
digit HS level. Note that values (expressed in local monetary unit) are converted into US 
dollars using the exchange rate of the day of the import.  
  
Ln(# imports): At the HS-6 product-trade partner level, the Naperian logarithm of the total 
number of import declarations. Computed from information provided by the IT department, 
local customs. 
 
Ln(# imports from the world): At the HS-6 product level, the Naperian logarithm of the total 
number of import declarations (from the world). Computed from information provided by the 
IT department, local customs.  
   
PSI frequency: At the HS-6 product-trade partner level, the fraction of import declarations in 
the original database submitted to a PSI. When a PSI is carried out, a report of findings is 
sent to the local customs service. This document specifies, among others, the total value, the 
incoterm, the exchange rate and the classification of goods. Information about the presence 
of a ROF attached to the declaration is provided by the IT department, local customs.  
 
Taxes: Sum of effectively paid taxes  tariffs, excises and VAT  divided by the value of 
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